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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1285 
___________ 
 
RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-01512) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 2, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Appellant Raymond Edward Chestnut, a federal prisoner, appeals an order of the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court dismissing as moot his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
 In 2007, while Chestnut was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in 
Williamsburg, South Carolina, he was issued an incident report charging him with assault 
without injury, refusing to obey an order, and insolence toward staff.  A Disciplinary 
Hearing Officer (DHO) found Chestnut guilty of each offense and imposed sanctions that 
included the disallowance of 40 days of good conduct time.   
 In June 2013, Chestnut filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (where he was then incarcerated), 
alleging that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceedings.  He 
sought only to have his good conduct time restored.  In response, the Government argued 
that the petition should be dismissed as moot because the “DHO reviewed his decision 
and expunged Chestnut’s Incident Report . . . .”1  The District Court agreed, holding that 
“Chestnut’s petition for writ of habeas corpus has been rendered moot by virtue of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 As support for this assertion, the Government provided a record of Chestnut’s 
disciplinary history.  That record indicates that his good conduct time increased by 40 
days, from 62 (as of August 21, 2013) to 102 (as of August 28, 2013).  According to the 
Government, Chestnut’s release date changed by only 35 days based on the formula used 
for calculating good conduct time.  See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 (3d Cir. 
2005) (stating that “BOP utilizes a formula for calculating GCT which takes into account 
the fact that an inmate’s time actually served becomes incrementally shorter each year as 
he is awarded GCT”).     
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expungement of the incident report and the restoration of his good conduct time.”  
Chestnut appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review of the 
District Court’s mootness determination is plenary.  United States v. Gov’t of V.I., 363 
F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 The federal courts may adjudicate “only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.”  
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lewis v. Continental 
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).  The “case or controversy requirement subsists 
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. . . .  The parties 
must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”  Lewis, 494 U.S. at 
477-78.  “If developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a 
plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to 
grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”  Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 Chestnut’s personal stake in the outcome disappeared after he filed his § 2241 
petition when the DHO expunged the incident report and restored his good conduct time.  
The District Court was unable to fashion any form of meaningful relief and thus, whether 
or not Chestnut’s due process rights were violated (and we do not suggest that they were), 
the case became moot.  See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 596 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
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      For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court order dismissing 
Chestnut’s case as moot.   
